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The Principle of the Military Objective
in the Law of Armed Conflict

Horace B. Robertson, Jr.

IfN THEIR COMMENTARY on the two 1977 Protocols Additional to the
lLOeneva Conventions of 1949, Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch, and
the late Waldemar A. Solf remark that the definition of the "military
objective" in the sense of targets for attack had, until adoption of Article 52
of Additional Protocol 1,1 "eluded all efforts to arrive at a generally
acceptable solution."z This is surprising in that the principle of distinction,
from which the principle of the military objective is derived, is one of the
two "cardinal principles" of the law of armed conflict.3 The principle of
distinction itself, although an inherent part of both customary and
conventional law governing the conduct of war, did not receive precise
articulation in a treaty document until adopted in Additional Protocol I,
which states in Article 48 that:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

Military Objective

Development and Articulation of the Principle
of the Military Objective
Despite some embryonic intimations of the emergence of the principle in the
period of medieval Canon law,4 the chivalric codes of the international order of
knighthood, and the early war codes of certain European States/ the modern
articulation of the principle of distinction had its origins in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, probably under the influence of Rousseau's proclamation
that wars were disputes between States and not between peoples.
Consequently, military operations were to be conducted exclusively between
combatants in uniform, and unarmed civilians were to be spared in their
persons and property.6
The principle of distinction had its first formal recognition as such in
Professor Francis Lieber's Instructions promulgated to the Federal Forces in
the United States Civil War by President Lincoln. 7 Included among its
provisions is a recognition that in remote times the universal rule was, "and
continues to be with barbarous armies," that civilians and their property were
subject to any privation the hostile commander chose to impose.s But the
Instructions also recognize that as civilization has advanced,
so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction
between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile
country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more
acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, properry, and
honor as m~ch as the exigencies of war will admit. 9

The Declaration of Petersburg of 1868 10 tacitly recognized the principle,
stating in its Preamble that "the only legitimate object which States should
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy." This sentiment was also expressed in the Final Protocol of the Brussels
Conference of 1874,n
The Oxford Manual of 1880, in its first article, states, "The state of war does
not admit of acts of violence, save between the armed forces of belligerent
States."l2 An explanatory statement immediately follOwing the article notes
that "[t]his rule implies a distinction between the individuals who compose the
'armed force' of a State and its other ressortissants [nationals] ."13 Despite these
advances toward adoption of the principle of distinction in a conventional
instrument, the Hague Conventions of 1907 gave only limited and implied
respect to the principle. Without specific reference to the principle of
distinction or the concept of the military objective, a number of provisions
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explicitly require respect for the person and property of noncombatants.
Article 25 of the Regulations Annexed to Hague IV14 prohibits bombardment
of undefended places in land warfare, as does Article 1 of Hague IX for naval
bombardments. IS In both land and naval bombardments, the commander
ordering the bombardment is normally required to give notice prior to the start
of the bombardment. 16 In both cases, the commander must take all necessary
steps to spare, "as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick
and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for
military purposes."17 Proscriptions against harming inhabitants and taking
their property without compensation are found in a number of places in
Hague IV.IS
The first explicit reference to the "military objective" as a concrete rule of
warfare is found in the Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923. 19 Article 24(1) of
the Rules states:
Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective,
that is to say, an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a
distinct military advantage to the belligerent.

Although the Hague Rules were never adopted in a treaty instrument,
Lauterpacht states that they are regarded "as an authoritative attempt to clarify
and formulate rules of law governing the use of aircraft in war and they will
doubtless prove a convenient starting point for any future steps in this
direction.,,2o At least insofar as the definition of "military objective" contained
in the rules is concerned, Lauterpacht's prediction was, as we shall later see,
prescient.
Although the international community undertook a major effort in 1949 to
bring up to date the international rules for the protection of the victims of
armed conflict, the project was directed primarily to the protection of the
victims of war and did not include an attempt to modernize the Hague Rules or
other conventions dealing with the means and methods of warfare. 21 As a
consequence, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in an
effort to fill what it believed was a gap in the humanitarian law of armed
conflict, prepared Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the
Civilian Population in Time of War. The Draft Rules were submitted to the
XIXth International Conference of the Red Cross in New Delhi in 1957, which
approved them in principle.22 When governments failed to follow up on the
draft, the ICRC, at the xxth Conference in Vienna in 1965, proposed the
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reaffirmation of certain basic principles, which were adopted as Conference
Resolution XXVIII. The resolution provided, inter alia:
All governments and other authorities responsible for action in armed
conflicts should conform at least to the following principles: ... that distinction
must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and
members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much
as possible.23
Soon thereafter the General Assembly of the United Nations became
interested in the efforts of the ICRC and adopted a series of resolutions along
the lines of Resolution XXVIII, the most significant, insofar as our subject is
concerned, being Resolution 2675 (XXV). It stated that the General Assembly
affirmed certain basic principles of the law of armed conflict, including:
2. In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction
must be made at all times between persons actively taking part in the hostilities
and civilian populations.

4. Civilian populations as such should not be the object of military
operations. 24
These movements toward a codification of the principle of distinction and
defining the military objective received further impetus from a resolution
adopted by the Institute of International Law at Edinburgh in 1969. This
Resolution reaffirmed the "fundamental principle" of the obligation of parties
to observe the principle of distinction and defined military objectives as only
those objects,
which, by their very nature or purpose or use, make an effective contribution to
military action, or exhibit a generally recognized military significance, such that
their total or partial destruction in the actual circumstances gives a substantial,
specific and immediate military advantage to those who are in a position to
destroy them.25
The culmination of efforts by the ICRC and others to modernize and amplify
the 1949 Geneva Conventions was the Diplomatic Conference on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts (CDDH), convened by the Swiss Government
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in 1974. The Conference met in four annual sessions and in 1977 adopted two
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August of 1949. The
first is applicable to international armed conflicts and the second to
non~international armed conflicts. Only the former is of interest to us in that it
contains explicit provisions concerning the principle of distinction and the
concept of the military objective. 26
As a result of the deliberations of the CDDH, the international community
has for the first time in a treaty document adopted a specific and explicit
articulation of the principle of distinction and its derivative principle of the
military objective. Additional Protocol I (as of September 1997) has now
entered into effect for 148 States.
Although some aspects of the two principles are reflected in a number of
articles in Additional Protocol 1,27 they are expressly set forth in two articles,
Article 48, set forth above, and Article 52. The latter reads as follows:
Article 52 ~ General protection of civilian objects
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian
objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.

2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects
are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 28

It is noteworthy in the foregOing articulation of the definition of the military
objective that it follows closely the definition contained in Article 24 of the
1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare, although it is amplified in several respects,
reflecting particularly the additional ideas expressed in the Edinburgh
Resolution of the Institute of International Law. 29 Article 52, in essence,
provides a two~pronged test for whether objects are military objectives. The
first prong is that they must, by their "nature, location, purpose or use," make
an effective contribution to military action. The second is that their total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization must, in the prevailing
circumstances, offer a definite military advantage.
It should also be noted that in Additional Protocol I, the words "whose total
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization" have replaced "destruction
and injury," and the words "substantial, specific and immediate" of the
Edinburgh Resolution have been replaced by the less specific "definite."
201

Military Objective
The term "attacks" is also used in a broader sense than is traditionally meant
in military parlance, where the term was generally used to describe the use of
military force in an offensive action, particularly the launching of weapons
against the enemy. As defined in Article 49, " 'Attacks' means acts of violence
against the adversary, whether in offense or in defense."
Although the section of Additional Protocol I concerned with attacks does
not apply to naval warfare, except insofar as attacks from the sea or air may
affect the civilian population, individual civilians, or civilian objects on land,30
many modern navies have the capability and are often employed to conduct
attacks on land targets by naval artillery or missiles or by their air arms. Thus,
this section of the Protocol is explicitly applicable to this aspect of naval
warfare.
For armed conflict at sea generally, however, there has been no modern
counterpart to the codification effort reflected in the events leading up to and
the convening of the Diplomatic Conference which resulted in the two
Additional Protocols of 1977. Consequently, there has been no explicit
incorporation of the principle of the military objective into conventional law
applicable to armed conflicts at sea. The closest approach to that process has
been the series of Round Tables convened by the International Institute of
Humanitarian Law of San Remo, Italy, from 1988 to 1994, whose purpose was to
provide a contemporary restatement of international law applicable in armed
conflicts at sea.31 The Manual that resulted from the deliberations of the Round
Tables was not envisaged as a draft convention but was viewed by participants in
the Round Tables as a modern equivalent of the Oxford Manual on the Laws of
Naval War Governing the Relations between Belligerents adopted by the
Institute ofInternational Law at Oxford in 1913.32 The San Remo Manual adopts
essentially in haec verba the definitions of the principle of distinction and the
military objective found in Additional Protocol I. The relevant provisions are
included in a section entitled "Basic Rules" and provide that:
39

Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between civilians or
other protected persons and combatants and between civilian or exempt
objects and military objectives.

40

In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.
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41 Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. Merchant vessels
and civil aircraft are civilian objects unless they are military objectives in
accordance with the principles and rules set forth in this document.

The Principle of the Military Objective
as a Part of the Customary Law of War
Since the United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I, and the San
Remo Manual does not of itself have any binding effect on States, it is necessary
to examine whether the principles of distinction and the military objective
have become rules of customary international law and, in particular, whether
the United States recognizes them as such. To state the proposition another
way, are the provisions of Additional Protocol I and the San Remo Manual
articulating the principles of distinction and the military objective declaratory
of international law? If they are, then they are binding on States not party to
the Protocol, not as treaty obligations but as customary norms of identical
content.
According to the Restatement, customary international law results from a
concurrence of two elements: (1) a general and consistent practice of States;
and (2) a sense of obligation on the part of States to adhere to the practice.33
With respect to the first element (practice), acts which may constitute State
practice include diplomatic instructions, public measures, and official
statements of policy. They may also include acquiescence in acts of another
State.34 The practice required to establish a norm of customary law must be
general, but not necessarily universal. It should reflect "wide acceptance
among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity.,,35 As to
deviations from the practice, the U.S. Navy's Commander's Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations states:
Occasional violations do not substantially affect the validity of a rule of law,
provided routine compliance, observance, and enforcement continue to be the
norm. However, repeated violations not responded to by protests, reprisals, or
other enforcement actions may, over time, indicate that a particular rule is no
longer regarded as valid.36
With respect to the second element (sense of obligation or opinio juris),
explicit evidence of a sense of obligation is not necessary, but is certainly
helpful. Some of the same "acts" that demonstrate a general practice also serve
to indicate that a State is acting out of a sense of obligation and not just as a
matter of courtesy or habit. 37 With respect to the law of armed conflict,
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inclusion of a rule in a State's military manuals is persuasive evidence that the
State regards the rule as obligatory.38 Statements by government officials, even
those spoken in their private capacities, are helpful. A noted authority and
judge of the International Court of Justice has stated:
The firm statement by the State of what it considers to be the rule is far better
evidence of its position than what can be pieced together from the actions of that
country at different times and in a variety of contexts.39
A number of statements, both official and unofficial, by spokesmen for the
United States Departments of State and Defense, spoken primarily in the
context of an examination of Additional Protocol I and the U.S. decision not
to ratify it, have suggested that the U. S. regards the principles of distinction
and the military objective, as articulated in the Protocol, as customary
internationallaw.40
Most persuasive insofar as the United States is concerned is the opinion of
the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, concurred in by the Army,
Navy, and Air Force Judge Advocates General, that the United States
recognized as "declaratory of existing customary international law" the general
principles of the law of armed conflict stated in General Assembly Resolution
2444,4I Those principles include:
(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as
such, and

(c) That a distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part
in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the
civilians be spared as much as possible.42
As we have seen, incorporation in national military manuals is a strong
indication that a normative principle has matured into customary
internationallaw.43 Here, too, the strong indications from military manuals are
that the principle of the military objective, as formulated in Articles 48 and 52
of Additional Protocol I and paragraphs 39 and 40 of the San Remo Manual, is
recognized as a norm of customary international law. The current German
military manual provides:

441. Attacks, i.e., any acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence
or in defence, shall be limited exclusively to military objectives.
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442. Military objectives are armed forces-including paratroops in descent
but not crew members parachuting from an aircraft in distress-and objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite
military advantage. 44

The Australian Operations Law Manual for air commanders contains similar
provisions:
An aerial attack must be directed against military objectives. . . . Military
objectives are those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make
an effective contribution to military action. To be lawful, any attack on such
objective should result in a definite military advantage. 45

The Canadian Draft Manual also adopts the Protocol definition of military
objective essentially verbatim. It provides:
Military objectives are combatants and in so far as objects are concerned,
military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage.46

Two United States manuals are also pertinent to our inquiry, those of the
Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps/Coast GuardY Although predating the
actual signing of Additional Protocol I by one year, the United States Air Force
operational law manual apparently took into account the ongoing negotiations
in the CDDH, for its provisions on the principle of distinction and the military
objective are taken almost verbatim from the final provisions of the Protocol. It
provides:
In order to insure respect and protection for the civilian population and
civilian objects the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly direct their operations only against military
objectives. Attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives. Insofar as
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by
their own nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization
in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage. 48
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The Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard Manual, the most recent revision of
which is dated 1995, although pointing out that the United States is not a party
to Additional Protocol 1,49 nevertheless has also adopted, with one variation,
the Protocol formulation of the principle of the military objective. It states, in a
chapter entitled "The Law of Targeting":
Only military objectives may be attacked. Military objectives are combatants
and those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively
contribute to the enemy's war,fighting or war,sustaining capability and whose total
or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite
military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the
attack.50

The emphasized part of the foregoing quotation was the object of
considerable debate in the San Remo Round Table, which specifically rejected
it in favor of the formulation in article 52 of Additional Protocol 1. As stated by
Louise Doswald,Beck, who acted as rapporteur for the sessions of the Round
Table and was the editor of the "Explanation" of the San Remo Manual,
The majority [of the Round Table] felt that the Handbook does not take into
account developments in the law relating to target discrimination since the
Second World War. In particular, they feared that "war,sustaining" could too
easily be interpreted to justify unleashing the type of indiscriminate attacks that
annihilated entire cities during that war. 51

An annotation to a previous edition of the Commander's Handbook stated
that, "This variation of the definition contained in Additional Protocol I,
Article 52 (2) is not intended to alter its meaning, and is accepted by the United
States as declarative of the customary rule.,,52 In the new revision of the
Annotated Supplement, the annotation is revised to state that, "This definition is
accepted by the United States as declarative of the customary rule.,,53 The
inference that one may draw from this change in wording is that the United
States (at least its naval arm) has rejected the presumptively narrower
definition contained in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I in favor of one that,
at least arguably, encompasses a broader range of objects and products. In
justifying this position, the Annotated Supplement cites the American Civil
War,era decision of the United States with respect to the destruction of raw
cotton within Confederate territory, the sale of which provided funds for
almost all Confederate arms and ammunition, as well as the twelve "target sets"
for the offensive air campaign of Operation Desert Storm. 54 The text of the
Handbook itself states that, "Economic targets of the enemy that indirectly but
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effectively support and sustain the enemy's war,fighting capability may also be
attacked.,,55
From the foregoing, it would appear that there is a consensus, in which the
United States concurs, that the principle of the military objective has become a
part of customary international law for armed conflict at sea, as well as on the
land and in the air. We shall in the next section examine what objects the term
"military objective" embraces and attempt to discern whether the variation in
terminology in the U.S. naval manual does in fact suggest a broadening of the
scope of permissible targets for attack.

The "Reach" of the Term, "Military Objective"
In earlier centuries, when wars were generally fought with limited objectives
and the cleavage between armed forces and the civilian population was clear,
the distinction between military objectives and civilian objects was reasonably
apparent. Only in the immediate vicinity of the battle was the civilian populace
put in jeopardy by the fire of the contending armed forces. The problem of
protecting objects which were not legitimate military objectives could be met
by prohibitory rules exempting particular categories of objects, buildings, or
installations such as churches, hospitals, buildings used for charitable or
scientific purposes, etc. This was the pattern followed in the Hague Rules, for
example. 56 In modem warfare, however, with the tremendous increase in the
range and sophistication of weapons and with the mobilization of the populace
in support of modem armies, navies, and air forces, the cleavage is not nearly so
distinct. In the two World Wars of this century, the economies of all of the
major parties involved were completely mobilized in support of the war effort.
Nearly all industries were converted to war production; all power,generating
stations provided power for war industries; and the bulk of the adult population
was engaged in some activity connected with the war effort. At the same time,
the capabilities of the contending forces to strike targets deep in enemy
territory, primarily through their air forces, were vastly expanded. As a result,
both Allied and Axis powers conducted "strategic" bombing campaigns against
the industrial bases of their enemies which, because of the limitations at that
time on the accuracy of nighttime and high, altitude bombing, could hardly be
said to have discriminated between valid military objectives and the civilian
population and civilian objects in the vicinity of the military objective that was
the target of the bombing.57
Nevertheless, most twentieth, century international conflicts, particularly
those occurring since World War II, have not been of the magnitude and
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geographic scale of the two World Wars. Most were undeclared and fought
with limited objectives. Although geographically confined to relatively small
areas, the fighting was just as intense as in the two World Wars. The Korean,
Vietnam, and Gulf Wars in which the United States was engaged were
certainly intense but had little if any physical effect Gn populations and objects
outside the immediate area of conflict. The Falklands/Malvinas war between
Great Britain and Argentina was likewise limited. The differences in the
intensity and scope of conflicts have led some commentators to suggest that
there should be a flexible definition of the military objective, allowing it to
expand and contract "according to the intensity, duration, subjects, and
location of the armed conflict."s8 Both Additional Protocol I and the San Remo
Manual reject this idea, providing that the same criteria apply in general and
limited wars, although the San Remo Manual "Explanation" recognizes that "the
application of these rules to the facts should result in a more restrictive
approach to targeting in limited conflicts.,,59
Rather than follow the traditional pattern of establishing prohibitory rules
setting forth what objects were to be protected from hostile action, however,
the conference at which the 1977 Additional Protocols were negotiated
adopted a formula that provides criteria by which a responsible military
commander can determine, under the circumstances existing at the time,
which objects are legitimate targets for attack. As we have seen earlier, this
resulted in the two,pronged test of Article 52, namely, that, to constitute
military objectives, objects must, by their "nature, location, purpose or use"
make an effective contribution to military action and that their total or partial
destruction, capture, or neutralization must, in the prevailing circumstances,
offer a definite military advantage. Since this approach was a departure from
the traditional practice of writing prohibitory rules specifying which objects
were to be spared, it met considerable opposition at the outset of the
negotiations in the CDDH.60 This opposition was eventually overcome by
inclusion of the first sentence of Article 52, which, in the traditional
codification pattern, is prohibitory in nature, albeit without listing exempt
objects specifically. The second sentence, upon which we shall focus our
discussion, gives the commander a two' prong test for determining which
targets are legitimate.
The first prong of the Article 52 test, as well as the San Remo test, states four
conditions-nature, location, purpose, use-which, if they make an effective
contribution to military action, make an object a military objective. Some
objects, "by their nature," are military objectives and remain so at all times,
regardless of their location or use. Examples of such objects include enemy
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warships, military aircraft (unless exempt under some specific exception such
as those applicable to medical transports), stocks of ammunition, and
combatant personnel.61 On the other hand, the vast majority of objects become
military objectives only during the time that their particular location, purpose,
or use provides an effective contribution to military action. Civilian buildings,
for example, may become military objectives if they are being used by enemy
troops for shelter. Their "location" may make them military objectives if they
obstruct the field of fire for attack on another valid military objective. Factories
making civilian goods are not normally military objectives, but if they are
converted to manufacture war goods, their purpose and use may make them
military objectives. The ICRC Commentary suggests that "purpose is concerned
with the intended future use of an object, while that of use is concerned with its
present function."62 Civilian transportation hubs may also be important
military transportation links, and their dual use (civilian/military) does not
exempt them from becoming military objectives, although under these
circumstances the time of attack should be taken into account to minimize
civilian casualties. 63 Bothe et al. state succinctly:
The objects classified as military objectives under this definition include
much more than strictly military objects such as military vehicles, weapons,
munitions, stores of fuel and fortifications. Provided the objects meet the
two-pronged test, under the circumstances ruling at the time (not at some
hypothetical future time), military objectives include activities providing
administrative and logistical support to military operations such as
transportation and communications systems, railroads, airfields and port
facilities and industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the armed
conflict.64

The second aspect of the first prong of the te::t which must be examined is
whether the nature, location, purpose, or use of the object makes an effective
contribution to "military action." As we saw above, the
naval
Commander's Handbook substitutes the phrase "enemy's war-fighting or
war-sustaining capability" for "military action." Is there an actual substantive
difference in meaning, or is there merely a difference in perception?
Any difference between the two formulations would seem to come down to
the term "war-sustaining" in the Commander's Handbook. The term
"war-fighting" is equivalent to the Additional Protocol I term "military action."
On the other hand, "war-sustaining" implies something not quite so directly
connected with the actual conduct of hostilities.

u.s.

209

Military Objective

The San Remo Round Table specifically addressed the issue of whether
to adopt the formulation used in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I or
that contained in the Commander's Handbook. It concluded that the
Handbook's phrasing was too broad and might justify indiscriminate attacks
on entire cities. 65 The suggestion that the latter formulation might justify
attacks on entire cities seems to be an exaggerated claim. Nowhere in the
Commander's Handbook is there any suggestion that this phrasing would
open the way for unrestricted attacks on cities or other population centers.
In discussing what objects are included within its definition, the Manual
states that in addition to targets having obvious military value, military
objectives may include:
enemy lines of communication used for military purposes, rail yards, bridges,
rolling stock, barges, lighters, industtial installations producing war-fighting
products, and power generation plants. Economic targets of the enemy that
indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy's war-fighting capability
may also be attacked.

This explanation does not differ materially from the authoritative
interpretation of Article 52(2) by Bothe et al., who suggest:
Military objectives must make an "effective contribution to military action."
This does not require a direct connection with combat operation such as is
implied in Art. 51, para. 3, with respect to civilian persons who lose their
immunity from direct attack only while they "take a direct part in hostilities."
Thus a civilian object may become a military objective and thereby lose its
immunity from deliberate attack through use which is only indirectly related to
combat action, but which nevertheless provides an effective contribution to the
military phase of a Party's overall war effort.66

The San Remo Manual, although adopting the Article 52(2) phrasing,
nevertheless acknowledged that a civilian object may become a military
objective and thereby lose its immunity from
deliberate attack through use which is only indirectly related to combat action,
but which nevertheless provides an effective conttibution to the military part of a
party's overall war-fighting capability.67

Probably the only point of difference between the San Remo formulation
(which adopts the Article 52(2) phrasing) and that in the Commander's
Handbook is with respect to attacks on exports that may be the sole or principal
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source of financial resources for a belligerent's continuation of its war effort. In
support of the possible legitimacy of such attacks, the Commander's Handbook
cites the denial of claims for destruction of British,owned cotton exports from
the Confederacy during the American Civil War by an Anglo,American
arbitration tribunal. 6S It also raises the question whether Iraq's attacks on
tankers carrying oil from Iran during the 1980,88 Gulf War may have been
justified under the same theory, although it admits that the law on this subject
"is not firmly settled."69
The San Remo Round Table, however, firmly rejected the broadening of the
military objective to include such targets, "because the connection between
the exports and military action would be too remote.,,70
The second prong of the two,part test provided in Article 52(2)-that the
total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization of the object, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage-although incorporated in haec verba in the various national
manuals and the San Remo Manual, has received little attention from
commentators. Bothe et al. provide the seminal commentary on the subject,
stating:
The term military advantage involves a variety of considerations, including the
security of the attacking force. Whether a definite military advantage would
result from an attack must be judged in the context of the military advantage
anticipated from the specific military operation of which the attack is a part
considered as a whole, and not only from isolated or particular parts of that
operation. It is not necessary that the contribution made by the object to the
Party attacked be related to the advantage anticipated by the attacker from the
destruction, capture or neutralization of the object. 71

Although Article 51, paragraph (1) (b) and Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii)
use the more restrictive term "concrete and direct" military advantage, the
documents of the CDDH do not disclose the reasons for using different
expressions. 72 Examining the context of the expressions in the three articles,
however, it appears that the purpose of using the arguably more restrictive
phrase, "concrete and direct," in Articles 51 and 57 was to provide a less
subjective test for applying the rule of proportionality where there was a danger
of civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects in a projected attack. 73 On
the other hand, Article 52, paragraph 2 is concerned only with defining what
objects are military objectives. Of course, should the attack on a legitimate
military objective involve the possibility of collateral damage to civilians or
civilian objects, the arguably more stringent restriction would apply.
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The Application of the Principle of the Military Objective
to Armed Conflict at Sea
As we have seen above, the term "military objective" received no precise
definition in a treaty document until 1977, when Additional Protocol I
included one for armed conflict on land (and for attacks on land targets by
naval or air forces). 74 Although this definition does not apply of its own force to
States not party to the 1977 Protocol, we have also seen that the principle of
the military objective, essentially as articulated in the Protocol, has been
acknowledged to have been assimilated into customary internationallaw. 75
There also seems to be no question that it is also a principle of the law of armed
conflict applicable to armed conflict at sea. 76
Despite its relatively recent articulation in its present terminology as a
concrete principle of the law of armed conflict at sea,77 the concept of the
military objective, often referred to as the "law of targeting" or a subdivision
thereof,78 is reflected in many of the customary rules that have developed in the
conduct of naval warfare over the past two centuries-particularly those that
apply to what has come to be known as economic warfare.
Just as in land warfare, in warfare at sea, whether a person or object is a
legitimate object of attack or is protected from attack depends, in the case of
persons, on whether they are combatants or noncombatants (or civilians in the
words of Additional Protocol I), and in the case of objects, on whether or not
they make an effective contribution to the enemy's war effort (military action
in the words of Protocol; war,fighting or war,sustaining capability in the words
of the Commander's Handbook). Prior to the twentieth century, the distinction
was relatively clear. Warships and naval auxiliaries were legitimate objects of
attack. Merchant ships and their crews, whether enemy or neutral, were not.
On the other hand, private property at sea had never had the protection
from seizure by the enemy that it enjoyed in land warfare. Under the doctrines
of blockade and contraband, goods destined for (and in the case of blockade,
being shipped from) an enemy port were subject to capture and condemnation
by prize courts. The traditional method of enforcing these doctrines was to stop
a suspect merchantman and exercise the right of visit and search. Only if the
vessel resisted visit and search, was sailing in an enemy convoy, or attempted to
run a blockade was it subject to attack.
The advent of the submarine and aircraft and the measures adopted by the
adversaries to counteract these new means of naval warfare changed the
traditional law fort>ver and irrevocably. Neither submarines nor aircraft were
capable of conducting visit and search in the traditional manner. As a
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consequence, in World War I, German submarines (and to a limited extent
aircraft) attacked enemy and neutral merchant ships without warning. The
Allied forces in tum armed their merchantmen, formed them into escorted
convoys, and generally incorporated their merchant fleets into the war effort.
During the interwar period, the former Allied States sought to outlaw the use
of submarines as commerce raiders through a series of diplomatic moves,
culminating in the London Protocol of 1936,79 which purported to apply the
same rules to submarines that were applicable to surface warships. These
diplomatic efforts proved fruitless, however, and World War II saw a repetition
of the practices of World War I in an even more widespread and cruel
manner. so
As a result of the practices of both the Axis and Allied powers in World
War II, and the assessment of those practices by the Nuremberg Tribunal in
the case of Admiral Karl Doenitz,81 a consensus seems to have been achieved
among publicists and national military manuals that although the 1936
London Protocol retains its validity, the realities of modem warfare,
particularly global warfare, make it inapplicable in most situations. This
consensus is perhaps best expressed in the recent San Remo Manual, which
provides that enemy merchant ships may be attacked only if they have
become military objectives and states that the following activities may render
them military objectives:
(a)

engaging in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy, e.g., laying mines,
minesweeping, cutting undersea cables and pipelines, engaging in visit and
search of neutral merchant vessels or attacking other merchant vessels;

(b)

acting as an auxiliary to an enemy's armed forces, e.g., carrying troops or
replenishing warships;

(c)

being incorporated into or assisting the enemy's intelligence gathering
system, e.g., engaging in reconnaissance, early warning, surveillance, or
command, control and communications missions;

(d)

sailing under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft;

(e)

refusing an order to stop or actively resisting visit, search or capture;

(f)

being armed to an extent that they could inflict damage to a warship; this
excludes light individual weapons for the defense of personnel, e.g., against
pirates, and purely deflective systems such as 'chaff;
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(g)

otherwise making an effective contribution to military action, e.g.,
carrying military materials.82

Other manuals state the rules somewhat differently, but in essence prescribe
similar standards.83
The San Remo Manual treats neutral merchant vessels separately, excluding
being armed from the list of activities rendering them military objectives and
adding refusal to stop or resisting visit, search, and capture.84 The Manual
explicitly states that the mere fact that a neutral vessel is armed does not provide
ground 'for attack. 8s The U.S. manual is the most permissive of the manuals
examined in that it includes, as a final activity, authorizing attack on enemy
merchant vessels: ... "If integrated into the enemy's war,fighting!war,sustaining
effort and compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under
the circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to
imminent danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.,,86 This
latter provision has been subjected to severe criticism by Frits Kalshoven, who
points out that the adoption of Additional Protocol I in 1977 vindicated the
view, at least for land warfare, that contribution to the "war effort" is too broad a
test for determining whether an object has become a military objective. He
suggests that the same should be true in naval warfare. 87
When the development of aircraft technology reached the point at which air
transportation became a factor in international commerce, the international
community attempted to adopt the same principles for civil aircraft that were
applicable to merchant ships. This was first manifested in the 1923 Hague Rules
of Air Warfare,88 which, with respect to civil aircraft, closely mimic the rules
applicable to merchant ships.89 Although the Hague Rules were never adopted
in binding form, they have influenced the development of the law in this field,
and the military manuals generally follow the pattern established in 1923. They
have likewise adopted the view that activities conducted by them similar to
those that would make merchant ships military objectives would also convert
civil aircraft into military objectives. Again, turning to the San Remo Manual as
the typical manifestation of this pattern, it provides that aircraft engaging in
any of the following activities will render them military objectives:
(a)

engaging in acts of war on behalf of the enemy, e.g., laying mines,
minesweeping, laying or monitoring acoustic sensors, engaging in
electronic warfare, intercepting or attacking other civil aircraft, or
providing targeting information to enemy forces;
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(b)

acting as an auxiliary aircraft to an enemy's armed forces, e.g., transporting
troops or military cargo, or refueling military aircraft;

(c)

being incorporated into or assisting the enemy's intelligence-gathering
system, e.g., engaging in reconnaissance, early warning, surveillance, or
command, control and communications missions;

(d)

flying under the protection of accompanying enemy warships or military
aircraft;

(e)

refusing an order to identify itself, divert from its track, or proceed for visit
and search to a belligerent airfield that is safe for the type of aircraft
involved and reasonably accessible, or operating fire control equipment
that could reasonably be construed to be part of an aircraft weapon system,
or on being intercepted clearly manoeuvring to attack the intercepting
belligerent aircraft;

(f)

being armed with air-to-air or air-to-surface weapons; or

(g)

otherwise making an effective contribution to military action. 9o

Because attacks on civil airliners are likely to cause injury or death to embarked
civilians, they are exempted from attack while in flight, except in situations in
which their conduct is clearly hostile.91

A

s we have seen, the principle of the military objective, though slow in
coming to recognition as articulated in Additional Protocol I and
current military manuals, has been imbedded in the law of armed conflict for
several centuries. It appeared in numerous nineteenth and twentieth century
documents in the form of prohibitions against attacks against certain categories
of persons and objects such as undefended towns, churches, hospitals, historic
buildings, noncombatant personnel, and combatant personnel who were hors
de combat. The 1977 Protocol led the way in converting the principle from a list
of prohibited targets to a more usable concept for a military commander in
appraising whether a particular object or person could be lawfully attacked.
Both the old-style negative list of prohibited targets and the new-style'
permissive principle of defining the military objective have their drawbacks.
The former allowed the literal-minded commander to assume that unless a
prospective target was on the prohibited list, he could attack it, perhaps
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downplaying the related principles of collateral damage, avoiding causing
unnecessary suffering, etc. The two' prong test of the latter gives the
commander a great deal more discretion and requires the commander to
balance the value of the target against the military advantage to be gained from
its destruction or capture, obviously importing the relative question of
proportionality into the equation. It must be remembered, however, that the
old prohibitions have not been excised by the adoption of the new standard of
the military object. They remain in effect in the various Hague Conventions of
1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the treaties for the protection of
artistic, scientific, and historic monuments and institutions. 92 When properly
applied, the two' prong test adds an additional layer of protection to those
objects and persons who should not and do not constitute legitimate military
objectives.
The general acceptance of the principle of the military objective into
customary intemationallaw, essentially as articulated in Additional Protocol I,
marks a step forward in promoting the humanitarian goals represented in the
law of armed conflict.
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